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Abstract
Notions of agency and of weakness of will clearly seem to be related to one another. This 
essay takes on a rather modest task in relation to current discussion of these topics; it seeks 
to establish the following claim: If A is a normal human agent, weakness of will is possible 
for A. The argument relies on demonstrating that certain necessary conditions for normal 
human agency are at least roughly equivalent to certain sufficient conditions for weakness 
of will. The connection between agency and weakness of will is made through the use of an 
extended example that lays bare the links between the two.
There is considerable current talk of weakness of will and of agency in philo-
sophical literature. There is less discussion, however, of the relation between 
those two concepts, although it’s generally acknowledged that there is some 
such relation. This essay takes on a rather modest task in relation to current 
discussion of these topics; it seeks to establish the following claim: If A is an 
agent,1 weakness of will is possible for A. In that regard, then, we will address 
the following argument:
 1.  If A is an agent, then it is possible for A to be morally responsible for 
(at least some of ) A’s actions.
 2.  If it is possible for A to be morally responsible for (at least some of ) 
A’s actions, then A is capable of 
  a.  intentional action, 
  b.  making evaluative judgments concerning the actions she might 
  take and of carrying out or failing to carry out those judgments, 
  and
  c.  acting freely, which may be understood in terms of at least the 
  following: acting without compulsion or strong coercion, or 
  acting voluntarily, or believing that one has an alternative action 
  open to one. 
 3.  If A is capable of 2a, 2b, and 2c, then weakness of will is possible for 
A.
1 As stated later, the only agents of interest to my argument are normal human beings who are 
capable of intentional actions. 
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 4.  So, if A is an agent, then weakness of will is possible for A.
Premise two is the crucial premise for the argument. We will begin by briefly 
describing the reasons for believing that premise one requires little argument. 
The essay concludes with a brief discussion of premise three. The part of the 
larger argument that primarily requires an argument of its own is premise 
two. 
Concerning the discussion of acting freely in premise two, I follow Aristotle 
in considering the minimal requirements for voluntary action to be: (1) not 
being forced to act as one acts and (2) not being ignorant of relevant informa-
tion about one’s action. Aristotle’s positive criterion for voluntary action is 
“that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of 
the particular circumstances of the action” (Aristotle 1111a 21-23, Nicomachean 
Ethics, III, 1, Ross translation). Further, I mention believing one has an option 
open to one. It seems to me that such a belief does not work as the freedom 
condition for weakness of will. I include this idea because Donald Davidson’s 
well-known discussion of weakness of will takes belief as such a condition. I 
argue against parts of Davidson’s position in a separate essay (“Believing is not 
enough: A critique of Davidson’s freedom condition for weakness of will,” 
unpublished).
The argument as a whole involves a discussion of agency. The only agents 
of interest to my argument are normal human beings who are capable of in-
tentional actions. (It is possible, of course, that there are no beings that are 
capable of intentional action. If that is the case, then there are no beings that 
are capable of being morally responsible and no beings that are capable of 
weakness of will.) I use the term ‘agent’ primarily for two reasons: (1) I am 
focusing on human action, not on any other fact or assumption about hu-
man beings and (2) it is less cumbersome for both writer and reader to have a 
single word to represent this idea than to repeat “a normal human being who 
is capable of intentional action” (or some similar phrase) each time. The ques-
tion has been raised as to whether God is an agent and, further, whether one 
might claim that weakness of will is possible for all agents, including God (if 
God is an agent). Whether God is an agent is not relevant to my discussion. 
Presumably, if God exists and is in some sense an agent, then (1) there is at 
least one sense of ‘agent’ in which an agent is not capable of weakness of will 
and (2) the sense of ‘agent’ when that term is used of God seems to me to be 
different than the sense of ‘agent’ that may appropriately be applied to human 
beings.
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Concerning premise one above, it must first of all be said that it requires little 
argument. Those entities who are human agents are exactly the sorts of beings 
who are morally responsible (if any beings are). I believe that the reader will 
be likely to grant me that assumption. If one were to argue for premise one, 
the argument might take the following shape: (1) If A is an agent, then A has 
certain characteristics x, y, and z. (2) If A has characteristics x, y, and z, then it is 
possible for A to be morally responsible for A’s actions. (3) Therefore, if A is an 
agent, then it is possible for A to be morally responsible for A’s actions. Exactly 
which characteristics x, y, and z are is not easy to describe. The point is that I 
believe my reader will grant that whatever those characteristics may be agents 
have them and they are sufficient for the possibility of moral responsibility.
So, I take premise one to be in accordance with beliefs most of us share. 
There is considerable discussion as to what counts as moral responsibility. In 
its simplest form, I take being morally responsible as amounting to, at least, 
being an appropriate recipient of moral praise and blame. One part of being 
an agent is to be (at least possibly) morally responsible for at least some of 
one’s actions. If I say that Alan is an agent and that, without there being any 
extenuating circumstances, he stole Alice’s purse, or robbed Joan’s store, or shot 
Sam, I believe most of us will concur that Alan is morally, not just causally, 
responsible for those actions. All I need for my argument is acknowledgement 
that agency implies the possibility of moral responsibility, for at least some of 
the agent’s actions. I believe that such acknowledgement can be granted both 
by those who agree with my overall thesis and by those who do not agree.
Next, then, I will work through a series of examples that will illustrate and 
explore the three conditions of premise two. In these examples the question 
will be whether an agent is morally responsible and not just causally respon-
sible for an event or state of affairs. We might ask, e.g., what is the difference 
between: (1) faulty wiring was responsible for a fire, and (2) an electrician was 
responsible for the faulty wiring.
To say that faulty wiring is responsible for a fire is to assign causal respon-
sibility, i.e., to tell what part of the environment we point to, in particular, 
as the cause of the fire. Wiring is not morally responsible, but only causally 
responsible for something. An electrician, on the other hand, may be both 
causally and morally responsible for something, e.g., faulty wiring. It would be 
inappropriate to assign moral blame to the faulty wiring. It would be equally 
inappropriate to fail to assign moral blame to the electrician, at least in cer-
tain cases. The distinction to be explored is that between those cases in which 
it is appropriate to place moral blame on an agent for an action or conse-
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quence and those cases in which it is not. By distinguishing between these 
cases we will clarify under what conditions an agent is morally responsible 
and, by implication, how agency is related to the possibility of weakness of 
will.
Consider the following alternative explanations for why Susan, an electri-
cian, acted as she did (in installing faulty wiring):
Case 1. She was ill-trained and didn’t know that she was ill-trained and didn’t 
know that she was installing the wiring incorrectly.
Case 2. Her boss told her to 
 a.  hurry, or
 b.  disregard wiring regulations on this job, or
 c.  make sure that the building would burn down.
Case 3. She could not have done otherwise because she was drugged or 
brainwashed, and was thus compelled to do what she did.
Case 4. Someone held a gun to her head and said “Mess up the wiring.”
Case 5. She was having family problems and 
 (a)  correctly believed that she was unable to concentrate, or 
 (b)  falsely believed that she was unable to concentrate.
Case 6. She could not have done otherwise because White, an evil scientist, 
would make her decide to, intend to, and proceed to act in this way if 
she were not going to do so herself. In this case, either (a) she decides, 
on her own, to pay insufficient attention to the wiring and thus creates 
the faulty wiring which will be responsible for the building burning 
down, or (b) she would not have installed the wiring incorrectly on 
her own but does so due to White’s intervention.
I will use these examples to argue for a thesis about the necessary conditions 
for moral responsibility. The thesis I argue for is that described in the second 
premise of the argument I present at the beginning of this essay, i.e., If A is 
morally responsible for (at least some of ) A’s actions, then A is capable of (a) 
intentional action, and (b) acting either according or contrary to her evaluative 
judgments concerning actions she may take, and (c) acting freely, understood 
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in terms of: acting without compulsion or acting voluntarily or believing that 
one has an alternative action open to one. 
I take it that Susan is causally responsible for the faulty wiring in each of 
the cases described above. Since I am arguing concerning a set of necessary 
conditions, I use examples to argue my case in the following way: if one acts 
unintentionally (for example), then one is not held morally responsible, and 
one is not held morally responsible in that instance for one reason only—that 
one is acting unintentionally. I attempt to show, by way of these examples, 
that there are certain necessary conditions of moral action which turn out to 
be sufficient conditions of weakness of will. The extended example of Susan is 
intended to illustrate a sufficiently coherent picture of the necessary conditions 
for moral responsibility so that we may proceed to an inference concerning 
weakness of will.
The first condition for being morally responsible for an action is that one be 
able to act. In each of the cases we will examine the electrician’s acts. In some 
cases we would say that Susan is morally responsible for her actions and in some 
cases we would not. In what follows, I will be referring to moral responsibility 
whenever I refer to Susan’s responsibility for her actions, unless I explicitly 
state otherwise.
In case (1), where she is ill-trained and does not know that she is installing 
the wiring improperly, Susan is not morally responsible for this particular 
installation of improper wiring, provided she is ignorant and not culpable for 
her ignorance. As mentioned above, ignorance is one of two factors that make 
an agent’s action non-voluntary (the other being ‘force,’ which is similar to 
strong coercion or compulsion, to be discussed later) to which Aristotle al-
ludes in Nicomachean Ethics 1109b30-1111b5. Given that Susan: (a) is ill-trained, 
(b) doesn’t know this fact, (c) doesn’t know for some other reason that (due 
to being ill-trained) she is incorrectly installing the wiring, and (d) is not 
culpable for her ignorance, we do not blame her for what she has done. If we 
have reason to believe that she should have known that she was ill-trained, or 
that her training—which she considers adequate—often results in obviously 
(to her) faulty wiring, then we may blame her for her ignorance and may or 
may not blame her for this specific result of it. If, for instance, she could have 
been expected to compare her training to that of others, or could have been 
expected to discover that what her instructors taught her was at odds with in-
formation available from other apparently reliable sources, and so on, or if she 
recognizes that installing wiring according to her training results in obviously 
faulty installation, then she is responsible to recognize that her training is, or 
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is likely to be, faulty. On the other hand, we don’t blame her for inadequately 
installing the wiring in this case if she is intending to install it correctly, is 
not deceiving herself, and is simply mistaken about what correct installation 
requires.
This first example illustrates two necessary conditions for moral responsibil-
ity: (1) that an action be intentional and (2) that an action not be undertaken 
in ignorance of relevant information. First, then, we take Susan to be respon-
sible for intending to install the wiring correctly. If she tried to do what she 
intended to do, then she is responsible for her intention and for her trying to 
carry out that intention—even if she fails, through no fault of her own, to carry 
it out. So, in this instance, if she intends to install the wiring correctly and 
fails to do so only because she does not know how to install it correctly, then 
we do not blame her for this failure (unless we believe that she is culpable for 
her ignorance). Similarly, if she intends to install the wiring incorrectly and, 
instead, installs it correctly due to ignorance, then she is responsible for what 
she intended but not for what she accomplished. That is, if she does not intend 
to install the wiring a particular way, then (assuming innocence concerning her 
ignorance of how it is actually being installed) she is not morally responsible 
for its being installed that way. 
This result fits all instances of intentional versus unintentional action. Except 
for cases of negligence, which I will consider in a moment, if someone did not 
act intentionally, then they are not morally responsible for their action. This 
statement is the logical equivalent of: if someone is morally responsible for their 
action, then they acted intentionally.
Concerning negligence, we may say that if someone is ignorant of some 
relevant piece of information and is culpable concerning that ignorance, then 
she is morally responsible for her ignorance and for its effects. Someone is 
culpable for her ignorance if, given the general state of her knowledge and 
sources of information, she is morally responsible for failing to recognize either 
her ignorance itself or the possible effects of her ignorance. Of course, the is-
sue of negligence is large and complex. I only intend here to sketch the details 
necessary for my overall account. The simplest criterion for culpable negligence 
concerning ignorance seems to be that the person is responsible if he could have 
known what he was doing if he had exercised reasonable care in considering 
an action or in acting the way he did. In general, if someone brought about 
her own ignorance, recognizing it to be ignorance, or if she failed to remedy 
ignorance that she had reason to believe might have significant effects, she is 
morally responsible for her ignorance. 
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The second necessary condition for moral responsibility illustrated by the 
above example is that the action not be taken in ignorance. This condition has 
already been discussed to some extent above. Susan is not morally responsible 
for installing the wiring incorrectly if she does not know that she is doing so 
and further believes that she is installing it correctly. If Susan is ignorant (and 
not culpably so) in doing x (thinking, say, that she is doing y instead), then she 
is not morally responsible for doing x. This condition seems straightforward 
and in need of little explanation. If an agent is ignorant of the relevant details 
concerning an action he believes himself to be performing, then that agent is 
not morally responsible for the action he performs (given an absence of cul-
pability). This statement translates logically into the following: If an agent is 
morally responsible for an action, then he is not ignorant of the relevant details 
concerning that action.
So, we can say that if an agent is morally responsible for an action, then that 
action is both intentional and one concerning which the agent is not relevantly 
ignorant. All we need for the second major premise of the argument pursued 
in this essay is the possibility of being morally responsible. One can easily 
see that if having x is a necessary condition for R, then being capable of x is 
a necessary condition for the possibility of R. In a similar way, then, we can 
conclude: If it is possible for A to be morally responsible for (at least some of ) 
A’s actions, then A is capable of intentional actions and of actions concerning 
which she is not ignorant. 
If, as in case (2a), Susan’s boss tells her to hurry, we will excuse her from re-
sponsibility if, but only if, she unthinkingly or under strong coercion or under 
compulsion follows orders or she incorrectly installs the wiring unwittingly 
while trying to hurry. First of all, then, concerning her unthinkingly following 
orders, there are three alternative assessments which may fit this case, and surely 
one of them does: (a) If Susan unthinkingly follows orders, then we will not 
hold her responsible for following those orders but we will hold her responsible 
for failing to think about what she is doing. (b) If Susan unthinkingly follows 
orders, then we will hold her responsible for following those orders because she 
failed to think before doing so and she is responsible so to think. (c) If Susan 
unthinkingly follows orders because she holds a firm judgment that follow-
ing her boss’s orders is the best thing for her to do when on the job or in this 
particular case, we will hold her responsible for her judgment but not for her 
action (unless we hold her culpably ignorant in holding that judgment). In 
instance (a) she is not responsible for the specific action she takes in following 
orders but is responsible for the act of following orders without thinking. In 
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instance (b) she is responsible for the action she engages in when following 
orders. In instance (c) she is responsible for her judgment, but is responsible 
for her action only if she is culpably ignorant in holding that judgment. 
Second, cases such as (2a) in which Susan’s boss tells her to hurry can be 
considered with other cases of ignorance, such as we discussed in relation to 
case (1), or with instances of compulsion/strong coercion, which we will discuss 
in greater detail later. If she is told by her boss to disregard regulations (case 
2b) or to make it likely that the building burns due to faulty wiring (case 2c), 
we will hold her responsible unless she believes regulations not to apply in 
the first case or, in the second, believes that the appropriate task of her firm is 
to cause this building to burn. We hold her responsible for making a proper 
evaluation or judgment concerning the situation in which she finds herself, 
and for acting in accordance with her better judgment, or failing so to act. We 
may conclude, then, that being capable of evaluating actions that one might 
take is another condition of responsibility. Susan is morally responsible both 
for judging what she ought to do and for carrying out or failing to carry out 
the judgments she makes.
It is evident from examining this example that, in addition to the necessary 
conditions for moral responsibility described above, there is another condition. 
If an agent is morally responsible, then that agent is capable of making evalu-
ative judgments concerning the actions she might take and of carrying out or 
failing to carry out those judgments. It seems unnecessary here to try to explain 
in detail what making judgments involves. Trying to pin down this concept 
would lead us far a field and such a discussion is not germane to the argument 
at hand. Further, concerning the concept of “carrying out or failing to carry 
out those judgments,” I am not suggesting that the agent must have some form 
of libertarian or other non-deterministic freedom. I am simply asserting that, 
on whatever compatibilist or incompatibilist terms one wishes to consider, the 
agent is able both to carry out her evaluative judgments and also to fail to do so. 
The agent must be able to act on or fail to act on her judgments. A description 
of the sort of freedom this ability implies need not concern us here. Following 
then what was said in the previous case, we can conclude that if it is possible for 
A to be morally responsible for (at least some of ) A’s actions, then A is capable 
of making evaluative judgments concerning the actions she might take and of 
carrying out or failing to carry out those judgments.
In case (3), Susan could not have done otherwise (than to improperly install 
the wiring) because she was drugged or brainwashed. She was compelled to do 
as she did. It seems obvious that compulsion implies lack of moral responsibil-
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ity and, therefore, being capable of not being compelled and in any specific 
instance not in fact being compelled is necessary for the possibility of moral 
responsibility. But in order to more clearly understand what this conclusion 
suggests, we need to examine the concept of compulsion.
  In order to try to understand what is meant, then, when we say that Susan 
was compelled to do as she did, I will briefly investigate the notion of compul-
sion used here. The point at issue is the situation of being compelled to act in 
a particular way, although the account I give of compulsion fits other cases of 
compulsion as well. What, then, is compulsion?
I offer the following thesis concerning compulsion: A is compelled by Y to do 
x at time t and in way w iff Y is causally sufficient for A’s doing x at time t and 
in way w (and Y is not simply describable in terms of A’s acting as an agent). 
Either the time or the way one acts can be thought of narrowly or broadly. The 
narrow interpretation may be compared to calling an event or state of affairs a 
particular. The broad interpretation may be compared to calling an event or a 
state of affairs a universal. This distinction is discussed by Peter van Inwagen 
(“Ability and Responsibility,” Philosophical Review, 87 (April 1978) 201-224, 
reprinted in Moral Responsibility, ed. John Martin Fischer). Nothing of signifi-
cance for my discussion relies upon taking events or states of affairs in one of 
these ways rather than the other. 
Let us suppose then that Arthur is about to bend over to pick up a stick from 
the ground. (It obscures his favorite path through the woods and he intends 
to remove it.) Moments before he would have done so, however, he hears a 
gunshot nearby. He bends over hoping that, if someone is shooting his way, 
they will be more likely to miss him if he is bent over. Arthur’s bending over 
in the woods on Tuesday afternoon is in the terms I am using a broad descrip-
tion of his action, an action potentially motivated in different ways (We might 
compare what I am here calling a “broad” description of an action to Danto’s 
idea of “basic actions” (1965)). Arthur’s bending over (beginning to bend over) 
at 2:36:20 p.m. Tuesday, March 7, 1995, because he intends to pick up a stick is a 
narrow description, fitting only a situation that turns out not to be the case.
If I want to turn my head and James, my friend who’s a weight-lifter, turns 
my head exactly in the direction I would have turned it (though not in exactly 
the same way that I would have turned it), his action is causally sufficient for my 
head’s turning even though I would have turned it anyway. My head’s turning, 
in this case, is compelled. If I want to take a drug and my addiction makes me 
take it, the addiction is causally sufficient for my action, although I would have 
taken the drug anyway. My taking the drug, in this case, is compelled, despite 
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my wanting to take the drug. In both cases, I would have acted to (somewhat) 
the same effect if I had not been compelled. And if I had acted in that way 
prior to the compelling action of James or the addiction, I would not have been 
compelled despite the fact that what I did would have occurred anyway.
Suppose that Sam wants, as he would put it, “more than anything in the 
world” to date Rachel. He asks her out and, much to his surprise, she accepts 
and they go out on a date. Was Sam compelled to ask her out and subsequently 
to go out with her by his want? It seems not. Although the want strongly in-
clined Sam to act, it was not causally sufficient for the action. Given even a very 
strong want, an agent is not ordinarily compelled to act on that want. If the 
want is such that Sam’s having it is causally sufficient for Sam’s action, then he 
is compelled to act in that way and he no longer simply wants to act that way. 
A strong want, then, may be differentiated from a psychological compulsion. 
Something internal to Sam as agent – I am referring here to something internal 
to Sam’s mental functioning, not to something internal to Sam’s physiology, 
such as a heart attack or a stroke – could intervene between a strong want 
and an action, but not between a compulsion and an action. If Sam had no 
beliefs, wants, or values at conflict with asking Rachel out and then going out 
with her when she accepts, does his very strong want compel him to act? The 
answer is still no. A series of decisions stands between Sam’s want and Sam’s 
action. We might note here that if the thesis of determinism is true, although 
Sam’s ‘want’ may not compel him, the series of Sam’s decisions and the state 
of the universe as a whole is causally sufficient for him to act as he does. If 
determinism is false, then it could be that neither Sam’s wants nor his decisions 
are causally sufficient for his action. In any case, the process of deciding can 
be swept aside by a compulsion to act. It is important to distinguish between 
Sam’s wants and decisions and those things which compel (or which strongly 
coerce) Sam to act.
Returning, then, to the example of Susan the electrician, we will examine 
next the case in which she is strongly coerced. As a working distinction, I take 
coercion to allow the agent an alternative to the coerced action and strong 
coercion to offer only normally unacceptable alternatives. When one is com-
pelled there is not an alternative available to one. I have defined compulsion 
in more detail in the immediately previous section. What constitutes strong 
enough coercion to relieve the agent of responsibility is dependent on the 
context. Case (4), in which someone holds a gun to Susan’s head, has obvious 
implications for moral responsibility. We ordinarily consider having someone 
hold a gun to one’s head a sufficient reason for carrying out the action the gun 
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wielder demands. We would ask if the gun is loaded, whether the person hold-
ing the gun is joking, whether Susan is able readily to disarm the gun holder, 
and so on. But, under normal circumstances, we would consider someone 
excusably coerced by having a gun held to her head. We would say that Susan 
is not responsible for her action in this case, if she is either strongly enough 
coerced or if she is compelled. If she is not either sufficiently strongly coerced 
or compelled by the gun to her head, then she is responsible. Thus, since being 
either strongly enough coerced or compelled to act as one acts makes one not 
responsible, not being either so coerced or compelled is a necessary condition 
of responsibility. Further, this implies that one’s being capable of acting without 
compulsion or strong coercion is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
moral responsibility.
If, as in case (5), Susan believes she cannot concentrate due to family prob-
lems, we do not hold her responsible if, but only if, either what she believes is 
true and she literally cannot concentrate, or she has no legitimate reason for 
doubting her belief. Of course, if she literally cannot concentrate (5a), then 
the first disjunct above is fulfilled and we do not hold her responsible. If she 
believes that she cannot concentrate adequately and her belief is false (5b), we 
will have to understand the sincerity of her belief in order to make a judgment. 
Case (5), then, agrees with our earlier conclusions concerning ignorance or 
compulsion/strong coercion as legitimate excuses. In case (5a) Susan appears 
to be compelled not to concentrate by her family troubles, and we would 
excuse her. In case (5b), if her belief is sincere, she is ignorant of her ability to 
concentrate and, we must suppose, finds herself sufficiently distracted so that 
she does not concentrate. Of course, we must recognize that if strict causal 
determinism is true and Susan does not concentrate, she does not have the 
ability, in this circumstance and given who she is at this time, to concentrate. In 
our ordinary moral judgments, and most of our philosophical ones, we judge 
Susan as though she had abilities which, in a given circumstance, she could—in 
the strict sense—exercise but is not exercising. We see here, as in case (1), that 
if one is ignorant, strongly coerced, or compelled, one is not responsible for 
one’s actions. But we can reach another conclusion as well. One’s belief that 
one has or does not have an alternative open to one is a factor in one’s being or 
not being responsible. If an agent legitimately believes that he does not have 
an alternative, then he is not morally responsible for acting as he does. There 
is a difficult issue here of how one ought to act if one legitimately yet falsely 
believes that one has no alternatives. Is one morally responsible for trying to 
act as one thinks one should? 
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It seems to me as though this is the case. If, for instance, an agent believes 
falsely that he is locked in a room and is aware of some action he ought to take 
that requires leaving that room, then he is probably responsible for attempt-
ing to do what he believes he cannot do. I think the responsibility one has in 
this instance may be proportional to the level of moral obligation one has for 
action as well as, perhaps, to the strength of one’s belief concerning a lack of 
alternatives. It also seems to be the case that one is morally responsible for an 
action one takes if one believes oneself to have an alternative when one does 
not. The complexities of the relationship between belief and responsibility go 
beyond the scope of the present essay. As previously mentioned, some of these 
issues concerning belief and choice are addressed by Davidson (1980).
In case (6) we have a Frankfurt-style example similar to the one originally de-
signed to defeat the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), defined by Frank-
furt as follows: “... a person is morally responsible for what he has done only 
if he could have done otherwise.” This formulation of PAP is found in Harry 
G. Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” (Journal of 
Philosophy, 66 (December 1969), 828-839, reprinted in Moral Responsibility, ed-
ited by John Martin Fischer – the above quote is found on p. 143 of the latter). 
White, an evil scientist, would make Susan decide to, intend to, and proceed 
to act in a particular way if she were not going to do so herself. In case (6a) – 
in which Susan decides, without intervention, to pay insufficient attention to 
the wiring – it seems clear that we will hold Susan morally responsible for her 
failure, although it certainly appears that she could not have done otherwise. 
This demonstrates a distinction between ‘could not have done otherwise’ and 
compulsion. As a morally responsible agent, she is not compelled to act as she 
does, for neither her decision to act that way, nor an intervention by White, 
is causally sufficient for her action. Susan’s decision is not causally sufficient 
for her action because, at least so examples of this type assume, she could have 
decided otherwise (were it not for White). Her decision to act and the possible 
intervention by White are jointly causally sufficient for her acting as she does, 
but if White were to intervene Susan would no longer morally responsible (as 
we shall see shortly). Her action is free of compulsion, although she appears to 
be unable to do otherwise.
In case (6b) Susan would not have installed the wiring incorrectly on her 
own but, due to White’s intervention, she does so. In this case we will not hold 
Susan morally responsible for the faulty wiring, but instead will hold White 
responsible. If Susan were to stab someone with a kitchen knife, we would 
not hold the knife morally responsible for the stabbing. We would hold Susan 
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responsible, the knife being only an instrument of Susan’s. The knife would be 
causally responsible for the wound (and so would Susan, by a transitivity of 
causation). So, in case (6b) we will have to rule that White, rather than Susan, 
is morally responsible for messing up the installation of the wiring. We do not 
hold Susan responsible, since, although Susan was the instrument of action, the 
action was brought about in the (morally) relevant way by White. In case (6b) 
we ought to say that Susan is causally but not morally responsible for the faulty 
wiring and that White is causally responsible (by transitivity) and morally 
responsible. The moral agent in the case where White causes Susan to decide, 
intend, and proceed to act in a particular way is clearly White, not Susan.
In all the cases above in which Susan is not morally responsible for her ac-
tions, we recognize her either acting involuntarily or acting as an instrument 
in the action (and in causing certain results). In either case we do not see her 
as a moral agent in relation to the action or its consequences. If one is igno-
rant (concerning the particulars), or strongly coerced or compelled (either to 
act or to want to act),2 one is not responsible for one’s actions. In the case of 
ignorance, one is not the instrument of another, yet one fails to act fully as an 
agent. Action done in ignorance is a kind of involuntary action. In the case of 
compulsion – also a form of involuntary action –, one can properly be called an 
instrument of another, e.g., of one’s compelling desires or of the mad scientist 
or the gunman who compels. Strictly speaking, of course, we want to say that 
a gunman never compels since when one is confronted by a gunman either one 
is compelled by one’s fear or another internal state, or one is strongly coerced 
by the gunman, i.e., the gunman offers normally unacceptable alternatives to 
doing as the gunman says. Coercion does not make the agent unable to do 
otherwise, although in most cases strong coercion becomes increasingly hard 
to distinguish from compulsion.
What is the case when one is morally responsible for one’s actions? We have 
used the example of Susan, an electrician who installs faulty wiring, to make 
clear a simple analysis of the relation between certain types of action and 
moral responsibility. We have aimed to show what conditions are necessary 
for the possibility of moral responsibility. Our conclusions may be described 
as follows:
Premise 2. If it is possible for A to be morally responsible for (at least some 
of ) A’s actions, then A is capable of 
2 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b30-1111b5, where that which makes an action invol-
untary, and thus makes the agent not morally responsible, is ignorance or force.
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 a.  intentional action;
 b.  making evaluative judgments concerning the actions she might take 
and of carrying out or failing to carry out those judgments; 
 and
 c.  acting freely, which may be understood in terms of at least the follow-
ing: acting without compulsion or strong coercion, or acting volun-
tarily, or believing that one has an alternative action open to one. 
Having established these necessary conditions of moral responsibility, we are 
ready to turn to a brief discussion of weakness of will. First, what is weakness 
of will? Weakness of will (WW) is generally believed to have three conditions 
which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a particular act to 
be an instance of WW.3 There is wide agreement that a weak-willed action is 
an intentional action and that it is contrary to one’s better, or preferred,4 judg-
ment. The third condition is variously described as: that an act is uncompelled,5 
voluntary,6 or free,7 or that one believes one has an alternative open to one.8 
If agents are capable of engaging in actions that fulfill these conditions, then 
WW is possible for an agent. 
Conditions for weakness of will are described by the following: Robert Audi, 
in “Weakness of Will and Rational Action,” defines WW as follows: “... we 
may take incontinent actions to be uncompelled actions against one’s better judg-
ment” (1993, 321). Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, in “Akrasia and Conflict,” says, 
“The akratic agent voluntarily acts against his preferred judgment” (1988, 255). 
Donald Davidson, in “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?”, says, “In doing 
x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: (a) the agent does x intentionally; 
(b) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and (c) the 
agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do 
x” (1980, 22). Finally, Alfred R. Mele, in Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-
3 These three conditions are found in most discussions of weakness of will. They are set forth 
with particular clarity by Donald Davidson in “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in 
his Essays on Actions and Events and by Alfred R. Mele in Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, 
Self-Deception, and Self-Control.
4 Amelie Rorty
5 Robert Audi
6 Amelie Rorty
7 Alfred R. Mele.
8 Donald Davidson. Davidson adds in a footnote that WW is understood to be free, implying 
that his condition of believing one has an alternative open to one captures what is essential 
in the idea of free action.
15Agency Implies Weakness of Will
Deception, and Self-Control, gives the following definition of WW, “Standardly 
conceived, akratic or incontinent action is free, intentional action contrary to 
the agent’s better judgment” (1987, 4).
As we can see from the necessary conditions for moral responsibility de-
scribed above, these conditions, or conditions very much like them, are a part 
of human moral agency. We can state our conclusions concerning agency as 
follows:
  If A is an agent, A is able (1) to act intentionally, (2) to evaluate or judge 
her possible actions and act in accordance with her positive evalua-
tions or better judgments, and (3) to act (a) without compulsion, (b) 
voluntarily (in a way that is free of relevant ignorance or force9), (c) 
believing she has an alternative action open to her, or (d) freely.10
As a quick comparison shows, these necessary conditions for agency are es-
sentially equivalent to the sufficient conditions for weakness of will described 
above. It seems apparent from this equivalence that since agency implies the 
possibility of moral responsibility, the possibility of moral responsibility im-
plies the conditions listed above, and the conditions listed above imply the 
possibility of weakness of will, then agency implies the possibility of weakness 
of will.
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